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the tax authority and the revision of the national bank law in 1997, allow-
ing the Swiss national bank (SNB) to use repos as monetary policy instru-
ment, the prerequisites for the development of a Swiss franc repo market were
given. The development of the repomarket in Switzerland only came up in 1999
with the provision of an integrated trading and settlement system provided by
SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collab-
oration with the SNB. The following paper provides an overview of the basic
characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well as of the
development it has undergone since 1999. It also discusses what motives and
reasons the banks possess to actively participate in the Swiss franc repomarket.
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1 Introduction
Until the end of 1996, a stamp tax, in the form of a turnover tax, was levied
on securities sales (including repurchase agreements (repos)) in Switzerland,
which made it unattractive for commercial banks to use repurchase agreements
and prevented the development of a domestic repo market. From the begin-
ning of 1997, tax authorities in Switzerland reinterpreted repos as a refinancing
transaction, omitting the tax levied. In addition to the reinterpretation, the
national bank law was revised in November 1997 allowing the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) to use repos as an operational instrument for monetary policy pur-
poses.While the Swiss franc repomarket was finally launched in April 1998, the
development and attractiveness of this market only came up with the provision
of an integrated trading, clearing and settlement system provided by SegaIn-
terSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration
with the SNB. Since then the market has substantially increased reaching out-
standing volumes of up toCHF 70 billion until June 2005.A division of the Swiss
franc repo market into two parts, namely in a so-called interbank and a SNB
market, reveals that in contrast to the interbank market, the latter one—which
the SNB uses for monetary purposes—attained high outstanding volumes from
the beginning. The immediate upsurge of the outstanding volume in the SNB
market can be ascribed to the fact that the SNB has almost exclusively used
repos to implement its monetary policy since 1999. Additionally, the adoption
of the newmonetary policy framework in 2000 has further increased the impor-
tance of repos and supported the development.1 Only fromApril 2004 onwards
did the outstanding interbank volume surpass the one of the SNB market and
remain higher for most of the time.
Of the few publications on the Swiss franc repo market, the paper by Jordan
and Kugler (2004) stands out. With data from January 2000 to September 2003
they show that the SNB has had a statistically significant influence on the
3M-Libor volatility. By fully meeting the banks liquidity needs, the SNB was
able to minimize interest rate volatility. In addition they found out that there
exists a volatility trade-off with respect to the maturity structure of repo trans-
actions used for monetary policy. Relying more on repos with a 1-day matu-
rity decreased (increased) the volatility of the 1W-Libor (1M- and 3M-Libor),
while usingweekmaturities increased (decreased) the volatility of the 1W-Libor
(1M- and 3M-Libor). A calculation of the variance of the 3M-Libor, defined as
the average of squared deviations from the target rate,2 reveals that the SNB
has managed to reduce the volatility from up to 23 basis points (bp) in 2002
to 1 bp in 2005. Considering that in 2004 and 2005 the SNB has mainly used
1 week repos—and much less overnight repos than in 2002—to implement its
1 For more information on the new monetary policy framework and the steering of the 3M-Libor,
see Veyrassat (2001).
2 The definition by the SNB where the 3M-Libor should be, was taken as the target rate. Where no
statement was made by the SNB, the middle of the target range was taken. Additionally the level
of the interest rate was taken into account.
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monetary policy, the decrease in the volatility supports the finding of Jordan
and Kugler (2004). Overall it can be concluded that the new monetary policy
framework as well as the use of repos as monetary policy instrument has led to
a successful implementation of Swiss monetary policy and to a rather precise
steering of the 3M-Libor.3
The aim of the following paper is to provide the reader with an overview of
the basic characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well
as of the development it has undergone since 1999. The first part of the paper
is divided into four sections. The first two sections provide the reader with a
definition of a repurchase agreement and a brief overview of the characteris-
tics of the Swiss franc repo market. The range of eligible collateral as well as
the trading, clearing and settlement in Switzerland also known as Swiss Value
Chain, and the implied risks will be described and discussed in the last two
sections.
The second part of the paper provides a more detailed overview of the devel-
opment of the interbank and SNB market. As will be seen in the following, the
Swiss franc repo market is dominated by three bank groups among which also
the group ‘banks from abroad’ figures. Hence the question on the motive of the
domestic as well as of foreign banks arose. The second part of the paper will
deal with this question and provide possible explanations. Finally the imple-
mentation of the SNB’s monetary policy via repurchase agreements, especially
the almost daily liquidity provision through fixed rate tenders, and the standing
facilities are presented and illustrated.
2 The characteristics of the Swiss franc repo market
2.1 A definition of repurchase agreements
A repurchase agreement is a financial transaction in which a so-called cash
taker sells securities (as collateral) to obtain money from a cash provider.4 At
the same time the two parties agree to reverse the transaction at a pre-specified
date. At this date the cash taker will buy back the securities and repay the loan
plus the accrued repo rate, which normally depends on the maturity of the
transaction and the securities provided. As the cash taker will repurchase the
securities delivered, he virtually remains exposed to the market risk, which is
why he remains the beneficial owner of these securities.5 In case the cash taker
should default during the term, the cash provider is empowered to sell the
securities. On the other hand, should the cash provider default, the cash taker
can use the cash amount to replace the securities he provided as collateral.
3 A discussion and empirical analysis on the predictability and transparency of central banks—
among others the SNB—can be found in Hock and Zimmermann (2005) and Wilhelmsen and
Zaghini (2005).
4 From the cash provider point of view the transaction is called reverse repurchase agreement.
5 This thus implies that the cash taker retains the right of dividend and/or interest distribution for
example.
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A repurchase agreement can thus be regarded as a secured loan, nearly elimi-
nating total counterparty risk.
Apart from the ‘traditional’ repurchase agreement, which is also known as
general collateral (GC) repo, participants can also conduct special collateral
repos. Again one party delivers cash while the other party provides the collat-
eral. But in contrast to GC repos, where the main purpose is the borrowing of
short-term liquidity funds, special repos serve for financing long securities posi-
tions and covering short securities positions.6 Hence the securities delivered
are of primary importance and not the cash. Just like in the GC repo, the cash
provider will receive the accrued repo rate at the repurchase date. However,
as the main purpose of the transaction is the borrowing of the securities, the
cash provider will have to pay a so-called fee, which depends on the ‘special-
ness’ of the security. Generally the fee is less than the repo rate, which is why
the cash provider will still receive a positive accrued interest rate. From early
August to mid-November of 2003, however, special circumstances led market
participants in the U.S. to lend money at negative interest rates to borrow a
particular Treasury note.7 This was mainly due to the increasing ancillary costs
of failing on an obligation to deliver Treasury securities as well as the rather
low level of interest rates. Until June 2005 this has never happened for special
repos conducted via the Swiss repo system.
2.2 The Swiss franc repo market
Since the omission of the stamp tax on repos and the provision of an integrated
trading and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex
and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC)8 in collaboration with the SNB, the Swiss
franc repo market has substantially developed. The Swiss franc repo market
can notionally be split into two parts, namely into a so-called interbank market
and a SNB market. All repo transactions that are concluded between banks
belong to the interbank market, while repos involving the SNB are assigned to
the SNB market. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the outstanding volume on the inter-
bank market developed slowly, surpassing the outstanding volume in the SNB
market only inApril 2004. The immediate upsurge in the outstanding volume of
the SNB market can be explained by the fact that the SNB started using repos
to implement its monetary policy, which almost exclusively replaced currency
swaps as main policy instrument by the year 2000.9
The SNB and interbank market also differ with respect to the maturities
traded. On the SNB market all transactions, with the exception of the year
1999, during which two and three month repos were traded, had maturities up
to one month. On the interbank market, in contrast, 50% of the outstanding
6 Veyrassat (2004), p. 46.
7 See Fleming and Garbade (2004) for a further discussion.
8 For a detailed description of the SIC System see Heller et al. (2000).
9 See Jordan and Kugler (2004).
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Fig. 1 Outstanding SNBand InterbankMarketVolume (aIncluding intradey transactions). Source:
Eurex
volume was due to repos with a term of 2 months and above. This finding can
be ascribed to the fact that the SNB prefers shorter-term repo transactions as
these mature more frequently and thus allow more flexibility on the implemen-
tation of monetary policy. The flexibility is insofar given as the SNB can adjust
its liquidity supply by conducting new repo transactions or not, more often
than with longer-term repos. In addition, less short-term repo transactions were
conducted on the interbank market, as a great extent of the short-term liquid-
ity needs had already been satisfied by the SNB. On average the SNB market
accounted for 78% of the outstanding volume of short-term maturities (from
Overnight to 1 month, excluding intraday) from June 1999 to June 2005.
Compared to the number of trades and outstanding volume of GC transac-
tions in the interbank market, special repos have developed poorly in
Switzerland.10 Of the 70,239 interbank transactions, solely 371 trades (0.53%)
were special repos, leading to yearly outstanding volumes between CHF 15 to
256 million (less than 1.2% of the total outstanding interbank volume). The
poor development can among others be ascribed to the existence of Securities
Lending and Borrowing (SLB), which has become very popular in Switzerland
in the last few years.11
10 A comparison to the SNB market is not made, as no special repo transactions have been con-
ducted on that market.
11 An additional reason is the size of the repo market. As the market is very small, the probability
is very high, that the other party finds out that the bank is having trouble in closing out her short
position.
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2.3 Eligible collateral12
On the Swiss franc repo market only a certain range of collateral can be used
for GC repos. To define this range of eligible collateral it is best to distinguish
between the SNB and interbank market. Eligible for repo transactions with the
SNB are all assets that belong to the ‘CHF GC Basket’, the ‘Euro GC Basket’
and the ‘GermanJumboPfandbriefeGCBasket’ (hereinafter ‘GermanJumbo’).
These three baskets were combined to one basket, namely the ‘SNB GC
Basket’, on 1 September 2003.13 The ‘CHF GC Basket’ consists of straight
bonds, floating rate bonds, warrant bonds and money market debt register
claims all with a minimum issue volume of CHF 100 million and denomination
in Swiss francs. Securities issued by Swiss banks are not included, as the SNB
does not want to lend money to the Swiss banking system and get securities,
which are backed by the same system.14 On 18 October 2005, 667 assets were
registered in the ‘CHF GC Basket’, adding up to a total nominal value of CHF
330 billion. Four hundred and twelve of these 667 assets were securities issued
by foreign issuers and international organizations, possessing a minimum rating
of ‘A’ from Standard & Poor’s or ‘A2’ from Moody’s, representing about 46%
(CHF 150 billion) of the total nominal value. The ‘Euro GCBasket’ in contrast,
contains solely government bonds issued by six different countries (Belgium,
Germany, France, Austria, Spain and The Netherlands). These government
bonds are all denominated in Euro and fulfill the requirement of a minimum
issue volume of EUR 1 billion. On 18 October 2005 the basket’s total nominal
value was EUR 2,740 billion, with Germany (40%) and France (29%) repre-
senting the countries with the highest shares.15 On 1 June 2006 the ‘Euro GC
Basket’ was renamed ‘Government GC Basket’ and now contains government
bonds denominated in euros, US dollars, pounds sterling and Swiss francs.16
The third basket is the ‘German Jumbo’, which contains German Jumbo17
mortgage bonds with a minimum issue volume of EUR 1 billion. This basket
was first introduced on 26 February 2001 and requires that the issuers possess a
minimum rating of ‘AA’ from Standard & Poor’s or ‘Aa2’ from Moody’s. Since
1 June 2006 this basket is called ‘International GC Basket’ and additionally
includes debt certificates issues by German territorial bodies and international
organizations, and bonds issued by individual borrowers with state guarantees.
12 This chapter is based on SNB (2004a).
13 Until 1 July 2003, the basket known today as ‘CHF GC Basket’ was called ‘SNB GC Basket’.
14 Cottier (1998), p. 39.
15 Until 4 March 2002, the ‘Euro GC Basket’ was called ‘GER GC Basket’ and consisted of gov-
ernment bonds from Germany. With the re-labelling on 4 March 2002, government bonds from
Austria were added. Securities from The Netherlands were then introduced on 3 May 2004, while
those from France, Belgium and Spain have been included into the ‘Euro GC Basket’ on 19 April
2005.
16 See Jordan (2006) and the SNB homepage for further details.
17 The term ‘Jumbo’ is used to refer to the larger, more liquid segment of the mortgages market
and to a minimum issue volume of EUR 500 million.
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Table 1 The three baskets by comparison
Value In % No. of In %
(bn CHF) of total securities of total
CHF Basket 330 6.5 667 59.6
Euro GC 4,256 83.9 277 24.7
German Jumbo 489 9.6 176 15.7
Total 5,075 100.0 1,120 100.0
Source: SNB; own calculations Values as at 18 October 2005
Denomination has moreover been extended to US dollars, pounds sterling and
Swiss francs. Furthermore the securities must now be rated at least ‘AA-’ from
Standard & Poor’s or ‘Aa3’ from Moody’s to be included in the ‘Government
GC Basket’ or ‘International GC Basket’.18
Comparing the three baskets with each other shows that the ‘Euro GC Bas-
ket’ possesses the largest total nominal value in CHF, while the ‘CHF Basket’
contains the highest number of securities (see Table 1). The finding that the
‘CHF Basket’ incorporates more securities can be explained by the fact that
the minimum issue volume is only CHF 100 million. On 18 October 2005 the
average issue volume in the ‘CHF Basket’ was CHF 495 million and approxi-
mately 91% of the securities had an issue volume smaller than CHF 1 billion.
With the extension of the baskets on 1 June 2006 the total nominal value of
the ‘SNB GC Basket’ increased by about 20% and now reaches approximately
CHF 6,000 billion.19
For interbank repo transactions conducted via the Swiss repo system, banks
can use the ‘SMI GC Basket’ in addition to the ‘SNB GC Basket’.20 However,
this basket cannot be used for repo transactions with the SNB. This basket
encompasses all components of the Swiss Market Index (SMI) and reached a
total market capitalization of CHF 837 billion on 18 October 2005. In contrast
to the other baskets, where the securities can be used for all contract types, the
‘SMI Basket’ can only be used for Overnight, Tom Next, Spot Next, 1 week,
2 week and non-standard repurchase transactions. The 1 and 2 week maturity
as well as the non-standard repurchase transactions were the most frequently
used contract types accounting for 88% of the overall 404 transactions. Table 2
reveals that the ‘SMI GCBasket’ was of minor importance for the total 231,198
GC transactions as this basket has only been used for 0.2% of all GC trans-
actions. One explanation for the scarce use is that a bank can barely re-use
the collateral obtained through a reverse repo transaction, as the SNB, as an
influential and important participant, does not accept the ‘SMI GC Basket’.
18 See Jordan (2006) and the SNB homepage for further details.
19 See the SNB homepage for more information on the total nominal value of the restructured
and extended baskets.
20 The ‘SMI GC Basket’ was first introduced on 5 March 2001 and comprised the ten most liquid
equities in the Swiss Market Index (SMI). In May 2001, the basket was expanded by five more
equities before the remaining SMI titles were included on 19 August 2002.
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Table 2 The different baskets used from June 1999 to June 2005
Year ‘CHF GC’ ‘Euro GC’ ‘German Jumbo’ ‘SNB GC’ ‘SMI GC’
1999 8,427 320 – – –
2000 21,817 4,290 – – –
2001 24,761 3,735 3,289 – 144
2002 30,890 3,947 5,839 – 162
2003 26,418 5,352 6,927 7,632 38
2004 1,018 175 637 47,881 47
2005 672 25 262 26,480 13
Total 114,003 17,844 16,954 81,993 404
Transactions based on ‘SNB GC’ before 1 September 2003 were added to ‘CHF GC’. ‘SMI GC’
includes all SMI baskets whether it was composed of 10, 15 or 27 equities. The ‘GER GC Basket’
used before the introduction of the ‘Euro GC’, was added to the ‘Euro GC Basket’;
Division was made according to the purchase date [Source: Eurex]
Additionally the treasury, SLB and asset management division are often sep-
arate bank divisions. Hence, while the treasurer cannot re-use the collateral
received, the SLB division, for instance, could very well use the SMI asset to
borrow another asset. Yet, as these divisions are separated, suboptimal com-
munication and additional expenses avoid the acceptance of SMI assets for GC
repos in the first place.
Before the introduction of the collective ‘SNB GC Basket’, the ‘CHF GC
Basket’ was themost important one, accounting for 77%of all transactions from
June 1999 to August 2003. After 1 September 2003, no precise statement can
be made as the collective basket was mainly selected. That the ‘SNB GC Bas-
ket’ was mainly chosen can be ascribed to the fact that the collateral selection
process is facilitated as securities from three different baskets can be selected
for a repo transaction.
Asmarket participants havemostly used the ‘SNBGCbasket’, which consists
of three sub baskets with different currency denomination and debtor catego-
ries, it can generally be concluded that since the introduction of the ‘SNB GC
basket’ the repo rate is independent of the collateral provided. Hence, ignoring
the transactions with the ‘SMI GC Basket’, it can be asserted that only one
interest rate curve is traded per day.
2.4 The Swiss value chain and triparty service system
In Switzerland, repo transactions are normally conducted via the Eurex Repo
trading platform and settled via SIS and SIC in collaboration with the SNB.21
This infrastructure also known as Swiss Value Chain enables a high degree
of standardization and automation, eliminating settlement risks and increasing
efficiency. The Swiss repo trading, clearing and settlement system was launched
in June 1999 and has since then providedmarket participants with an integrated
21 SNB (2004a), p. 7.
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Table 3 Number of settlements and triggered margin calls
Margin security Cash margin Total settlements Total transactions
2005a 24,634 64 92,317 117,015
2004 23,540 122 99,617 123,279
2003 21,861 68 93,015 114,944
2002b 9,367 10 81,099 90,476
Total 79,402 264 366,048 445,714
Source: SIS
a Figures are from January to October 2005
b Margin call and settlement figures are from July to December 2002 and January to December
2002 respectively
trading and clearing platform for repo transactions. This platformalso serves the
SNB to carry out its open market operations via repo auctions and to provide
the Swiss banking system with intraday liquidity.
Repo transactions conducted via this platform are called Triparty repos as
the cash taker and provider assign a third party, namely SIS, with the settlement,
administration and risk management of the repo transaction. During the term,
for instance, which is defined as the time between the purchase and repurchase
date, SIS revalues thrice daily the collateral at market prices (mark-to-market)
and calculates twice daily the net exposure22 a party holds vis-à-vis each par-
ticipant. If this net exposure exceeds the unilaterally defined variation margin,
which is the range within which it may fluctuate, the SIS requests a margin
transfer of the whole amount missing from the party providing insufficient cov-
erage. The margin transfer can either be made in the form of securities (margin
securities) or cash (cash margin). According to the data provided by the SIS,
institutions preferred to meet margin calls in the form of securities in more than
99% of the cases (see Table 3).
Risks in the Swiss franc repo market
The fully automated trading and settlement of securities as well as cash trans-
actions on a simultaneous, final and irrevocable delivery versus payment basis,
eliminates the settlement risk during the opening and closing of a repo transac-
tion. Nevertheless the parties are exposed to a so-called market risk, as in most
cases the business and purchase date differ from each other.23,24 Throughout
this time period the counterparty could default and the settlement of the repo
22 The net exposure is calculated by offsetting all open positions (i.e. exposures) towards each
counterparty considering all previously undertaken margin transfers.
23 The purchase date is not necessarily the date at which a transaction has been concluded (i.e.
business date). The purchase date of a one week repo for example, is two days after it has been
concluded.
24 See Csoport (2000), p. 107.
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Table 4 Arrears in the Swiss franc repo market
Number of arrears Total settlements Rate of arrears (in %)
2005a 9 92,317 0.00975
2004 12 99,617 0.01205
2003 22 93,015 0.02365
2002 10 81,099 0.01233
Total 53 366,048 0.01448
Source: SIS
a Figures are from January to October 2005
transaction would not be carried out. Yet, up to October 2005 this has never
occurred in the Swiss franc repo market.
During the term, participants are among other risks subject to credit and
liquidity risks. Credit risks arise from the volatility in the value of collateral, i.e.
if for example the market value of the securities serving as collateral declines
an under-collateralization may result. In the event of counterparty default, the
collateral would have to be liquidated at the prevailing (lower) market price,
leading to a loss for the cash provider.25 In Switzerland, credit risks are reduced
by the daily mark-to-market process and respective margin calls, carried out
and triggered by the SIS, as well as by variation margins, which can be adjusted
to counterparty characteristics. As the variation margin is regarded as uncollat-
eralized part of the loan, this amount will be subject to capital requirements.26
Unfortunately no precise statement can be made about the height of the vari-
ation margins chosen, but due to capital requirements, it can be expected that
the participants have mainly chosen variation margins that are lower than CHF
200,000. Liquidity risks on the other hand can arise if the cash provider for
instance has to sell the collateral due to counterparty failure, but the specific
securities markets are rather illiquid (or become illiquid at times of market
stress) or considerable price fluctuations emerge due to the selling of these
securities.27 This type of risk is also reduced in Switzerland as securities are
only accepted as collateral if they possess a minimum issue volume of EUR 1
billion or CHF 100 million respectively.
To sum up, it can be argued that the Swiss franc repo market is a market
featuring low risks. The Swiss Value Chain as well as the Triparty Repo Service
System provides an efficient clearing, settlement and risk management for the
participants in the repo market. As for the market risk, it can be concluded that
it virtually does not exist, as the rate of arrears has not even reached values
higher than 0.02% (see Table 4). In addition the settlements in arrears that have
25 See BIS (1999), p. 26. For a distinction between actual and potential credit exposure, which is
not drawn in this paper, as well as for a discussion on further possible risks, for instance operational
risks, see Csoport (2000), pp. 97–152 and BIS (1999), pp. 26–28.
26 For an overview on the current capital adequacy requirements (Basel I) and the revised frame-
work (Basel II), see BIS (2005).
27 See BIS (1999), p. 26 and Csoport (2000), p. 114.
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occurred in 2004 and 2005, were not cancelled but rather met with a delay of 1
day. Credit risks too are minimized in the Swiss franc repomarket, as all margin
calls were met on the same day until October 2005 and as it can be expected
that most of the participants chose a variation margin limit lower than CHF
200,000.
3 Participants in the interbank and SNB repo market
To participate in the interbank and SNB repo market, banks must hold a sight
deposit at the SNB, a securities deposit28 at the SIS and fulfill the terms of
acceptance by Eurex, SIS and SIC. In June 2005, 99 banks were registered for
participation in the Swiss franc repo market. While the domestic banks mainly
participate in the Swiss franc repo market because of reserve requirements—
which will be discussed below—it can be seen in Table 5 that a large part of
the registered participants, namely 45%, are foreign banks. Moreover it can
be seen in Table 5 that the main cash taker groups were big banks (UBS and
Credit Suisse), banks from abroad and the Raiffeisen banks. In the following,
a more detailed description on the development of the interbank and SNB
market as well as the reason for participation of domestic and foreign banks in
these markets, shall be discussed.
3.1 The interbank market
The interbank repomarket has developed slowly compared to the SNBmarket,
surpassing the outstanding volume of the SNB market only in April 2004 (see
Fig. 1). As of June 2005, the interbank outstanding volume reached a level of
approximately CHF 45 billion, which represents the highest level up to that
date. Dividing the interbank volume over the last 5 years into the different
maturities shows that on average 50% of the outstanding volume had a matu-
rity of 2 months and more, while the 1 week to 1 month transactions as well as
the very short maturities (Overnight, Spot Next, Tom Next) accounted for 27
and 12%, respectively. As mentioned before, this can among others be ascribed
to the fact that the SNB market has satisfied the short-term liquidity needs to a
great extent.
The main cash taker groups were the big banks, the banks from abroad as
well as the Raiffeisen banks. In the shorter maturities (up to 1 month), the
two big banks were the most active cash takers, accounting for approximately
50% of the outstanding interbank volume. The share of the banks from abroad
in contrast, amounted to about 30% in the 1 week to 1 month maturities and
15% in the very short maturities (Overnight, Spot Next and Tom Next). The
28 There are two types of securities deposits with SIS. The first is the ordinary deposit where banks
hold securities to carry out normal repo transactions with the SNB and other banks. The other
deposit is the so-called Custody Cover Account ‘SNB’ and enables banks to undertake special-rate
repo transactions with the SNB as well as to get intraday liquidity.
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Table 5 Participants and their share of outstanding amount
No. of banks Share (in %)
2003 2004 2005c
SNB IB SNB IB SNB IB
Domestic banks 54 48 58 60 57 65 62
Big banks 2 38 45 41 34 51 48
Cantonal banks 20 1 2 2 1 0 1
Raiffeisen banks 1 5 5 9 14 5 7
Regional and savings banks 5 2 1 6 1 7 1
Other banksa 26 3 5 3 7 2 6
Foreign banks 45 52 42 40 43 35 38
Banks from abroadb 26 51 42 38 42 33 37
Foreign controlled banks 15 1 1 1 0 2 1
Branches of foreign banks 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 99 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Eurex
Figures may not add up due to rounding
Participants division was made as in SNB (2004b) and as of June 2005
Outstanding amount was calculated from the cash taker point of view
a includes SNB, SIS, PostFinance, private banks, commercial banks and stock exchange banks
b incl. one bank from Liechtenstein
c From January to June 2005
Raiffeisen banks on the other hand were mainly active in the very short maturi-
ties reaching shares of total outstanding of circa 16%. In the longer maturities,
the banks from abroad and the big banks were the main cash takers, accounting
for more than 83% of the outstanding volume since 2002.
Looking at the cash provider side reveals that the categories big banks, can-
tonal banks, Raiffeisen banks and others (including, inter alia, mortgage banks
and PostFinance) are the main liquidity providers in the interbank market.
While the big banks were mostly cash providers in maturities between 2 and
12 months, the cantonal banks were more active in the liquidity provision of
shorter maturities (Overnight to 1 month).29 The Raiffeisen bank group’s share
was almost constant throughout the different maturities, whereas the fraction
of the category others was highest in the 1 week to 2 months maturities.
Minimum reserve requirements, the refinancing of loans and differences in
liquidity positions can be regarded as the main reasons for the development
of the secured interbank market. Differences in liquidity positions for instance
arise due to different fields of activity. Investment banks for example possess
less liquidity than private banks which mainly specialize in private banking. In
29 The finding that the big banks are one of the most important cash takers as well as provider,
results from the fact that an anonymization has been undertaken with the dataset. Thus this finding
could for example be generated by a situation where one bank is a cash provider and another a
cash taker.
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the following two sections, the focus and discussion will be on the explanations
such as the minimum reserve requirements and the refinancing of loans.
Reserve requirements
In Switzerland, as well as in other countries, banks have to fulfill liquidity
requirements. The Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks (Banking Law)
stipulates among others that banksmust have an adequate relationship between
their liquid assets on the one hand and their short-term liabilities on the other
hand. A distinction is made between a cash liquidity and total liquidity require-
ment.30 Currently, all institutions that have obtained a bank licence from the
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) fall under the term bank and thus
have to fulfill these liquidity requirements. In addition, branches of foreign
banks that may not necessarily need a bank license due to treaties with other
states have to meet these requirements.31
Until December 2004 minimum reserve regulations were in two different
laws. While arts. 16a–f of the old National Bank Act (oNBA) allowed the SNB
to use minimum reserve requirements as a monetary policy instrument, arts.
15 and 19 of the Banking Ordinance (BO) regulated the cash liquidity require-
ment. As the SNB had not used minimum reserve requirements as a monetary
policy instrument since 1977, they were abolished in the National Bank Act
Revision in 2004. Cash liquidity in contrast, facilitates the smooth functioning
of the money market and ensures that there is enough liquidity in the banking
sector, which reduces the probability that the SNB has to act as ‘Lender of
Last Resort’. As cash liquidity mainly serves for monetary purposes, its reg-
ulation was thus taken into the National Bank Act (arts. 17, 18 and 22–24),
as well as into the National Bank Ordinance (arts. 12–17) in May 2004. Since
then, the requirement formerly known as cash liquidity has been called reserve
requirement.32 While the required minimum reserves still have to amount to
2.5% of the average of the liabilities at the end of the three months preceding
the reporting period, the definition of eligible assets and relevant liabilities has
slightly changed. Eligible assets are coins in circulation, banknotes and sight
deposits at the SNB, all with denomination in Swiss francs. Deposits with the
postal checking accounts (PCA) and with other clearing institutions recognized
by the SFBC were excluded.33 Medium-term bank-issued notes and liabilities
arising frommoneymarket papermaturing within 3months have been added as
30 Total liquidity requirements will not be discussed in this paper, as they do not primarily serve
monetary purposes and have been fulfilled by more than 170%.
31 Art. 2 of the Banking Law.
32 After a grace period to adapt to the changeover from cash liquidity tominimum reserve require-
ments, the change took place as of the first applicable period in 2005.
33 Cash holdings were kept so as to avoid unnecessary transfers of these liquid assets to sight
deposits held at the SNB. Deposits with the PCA were excluded to avoid an uneven treatment in
comparison to bank deposits, which would especially arise if Postfinance entered into the lending
business. In addition, deposits with the PCA are not part of the monetary base.
254 S. Kraenzlin
relevant liabilities, while liabilities towards other banks that also have to hold
minimum reserves were excluded.34 The maintenance period for minimum
reserves has remained unchanged since 1988. Minimum reserves have to be
held on an average from the twentieth of 1 month to the nineteenth of the
following month.35
From 1999 to 2004 and 2005 banks fulfilled their cash liquidity requirement
on an average of 134 and 124%, respectively.36 Differing between bank groups
indicates that the big banks held barely more reserves than required, while
other bank groups such as cantonal banks, private banks, Raiffeisen banks held
at least 120 and 114%, respectively. Comparing the required reserves with the
sight deposits held at the SNB indicates that these sight deposits cover approx-
imately 60% of these reserves. It can thus be concluded that the reason for
holding sight deposits at the SNB not only emanates from the liquidity needs
of the interbank payment system (SIC) but also from liquidity reserve require-
ments. By requiring cash liquidity reserves, the SNB can therefore ensure a sta-
ble demand for central bank money. It can be estimated that the SNB satisfies
approximately 50% of the liquidity needs via its daily repo auction. Neverthe-
less, banks money demand is not fully satisfied by the SNB, thus leading to an
interbankmarket. In summary, it can be ascertained that one of the bank’s main
interest in participating in the interbank market as well as in the daily auction
on the SNB market, is therefore the minimum reserve requirement, allowing
them to get enough liquidity to meet the requirement.37
Foreign banks
While domestic banks and branches of foreign banks must fulfill the liquidity
requirements, this regulation does not apply to banks from abroad. Still Table 5
shows that this bank group has had a high share of outstanding volume in the
SNB as well as in the interbank market in the last 3 years, reaching values of
up to 51%. Dividing this group further in country of origin, shows that the
majority of the banks comes from Germany (9), Austria (6) and Great Britain
(4). Focusing on Austrian and German banks, an explanation for their active
participation can be found in the amount of loans they granted in Swiss francs.38
In June 2005, Austrian banks had loans outstanding in Swiss francs that added
up to EUR 53.5 billion. This outstanding amount represented 80% of foreign
currency loans of Austrian banks and 37% of total foreign currency loans of
34 For a detailed list see art. 14 BO.
35 See Gygi et al. (2001) for a more detailed overview on the National Bank Act Revision.
36 November and December 1999 values were excluded due to Y2K effect. For 2005 the January
and April observations were taken. Detailed data can be found in Tables B3 and B31 of the SNB’s
Monthly Statistical Bulletin.
37 For banks which are cash rich the main purpose is to reduce opportunity costs of holding cash.
38 Note that due to aggregation and anonymization, it is not known if the Austrian and German
banks were very active in the Swiss franc repo market. Still, due to reasoning provided in this
section, it can be assumed that they were active to a certain extent.
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Fig. 2 Outstanding amount a of 3–12 months interbank repo transactions. a(Calculated from the
cash taker point of view). Source: Eurex
all EU banks.39 The same applies for German banks, which had approximately
EUR 31 billion of loans outstanding in Swiss francs.40 Hence the main reason
for participation of Austrian and German banks is to refinance these loans on
the Swiss franc repo market. Taking in the fact that longer maturity repo trans-
actions are more convenient for refinancing and that maturities on the SNB
market are normally up to 3 weeks, the focus was set on the different maturities
of the outstanding interbank volume. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the 26 banks
from abroad accounted for 50–70% of the outstanding volume of maturities
between 3 and 12 months, underpinning the presumption of loan refinancing.
Of course the volume received on the repo market does not fully cover the
outstanding amount of loans granted. Further sources of refinancing are also
bonds in Swiss francs. In 2004 bonds by Austrian debtors, for example, reached
an issue volume of circa CHF 17 billion on the Swiss Stock Exchange in 2004.41
However, to which extent repo transactions and/or bonds have been used for
refinancing purposes cannot be determined precisely.42
39 90% of the granted loans by Austrian banks (EUR 47.8 billion) went to residents within the
EU. For further information, see the statistical database of the Austrian National Bank as well as
Klein and Swoboda (2004).
40 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2005), p. 88 for further details.
41 See Jordan (2004), p. 5.
42 See Jordan (2005b) and Jordan (2004) for a further discussion on foreign currency loans.
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3.2 The SNB market and open market operations
About a year before the adoption of the new monetary policy framework, the
SNB started using repos to implement its monetary policy.43 In 2000, repos
almost exclusively replaced currency swaps as main policy instrument,44 which
is why the SNBmarket has developed so quickly. Throughout the last five years,
the outstanding volume (excluding intraday) has almost always reached values
between CHF 20 and 30 billion. Except for the regional and savings banks, the
main cash taker groups are basically the same as in the interbank market, i.e.
big banks, banks from abroad and Raiffeisen banks. In addition to the so-called
main financing and fine-tuning operations, the SNB also offers a standing facil-
ity, namely a liquidity shortage and intraday facility. The intention of these two
facilities is to allow banks to obtain liquidity to bridge unexpected, short-term
liquidity shortages as well as to facilitate the settlement of payment transactions
via the SIC. In the following, the outstanding amount and relative importance
of the different facilities will be described and discussed.
Open market operations
Since 1999, the SNB has almost exclusively used the fixed rate tender45 to
provide the banking system with liquidity. Nearly every banking day, the SNB
announces the interest rate and the maturity of the contract and waits 10 min
to allow the banks to submit the amounts they wish to obtain at that rate. The
minimum and maximum amount per offer are CHF 1 and 100 million, respec-
tively. Thus to obtain more than CHF 100 million banks need to submit more
than one offer. In this fixed rate tender auction, the SNB then adds up all bids
and decides if it will fully allot the amount bidded (100%) or if it will allot pro
rata, i.e. after an allotment of a minimum amount to each bank the bids are then
satisfied to a certain percentage. As mentioned previously, the repo auctions
are open for domestic as well as for foreign banks as long as they hold a sight
deposit at the SNB and fulfill the acceptance requirements of Eurex, SIS and
SIC. From January 2001 to June 2005 the SNB mainly used the 1 week (1W)
maturity for its repo auctions (see Fig. 3). Looking at the development through-
out the years, further shows that the importance of the overnight (ON)maturity
decreased while 1W repos have become more and more important—since 2003
1W repos have been used in more than 75% of the cases. Figure 3 also displays
43 For a description on the new monetary policy framework see Jordan and Kugler (2004) and
Jordan (2005a).
44 See Jordan and Kugler (2004), p. 4.
45 In a fixed rate tender, the interest rate and the maturity of the repo transaction is announced by
the central bank. Apart from this tender, the central bank can also use a variable rate tender. In this
kind of tender, bidders submit interest rate and quantity pairs to the central bank. The central bank
will then choose an interest rate and will fully allot the bids that are above this interest rate. Bids
with interest rates below the one chosen will be disregarded, while those at the chosen interest rate
will be allotted pro rata. For a more detailed description of the two types of tender, see Bindseil
(2002) and Välimäki (2003).
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Fig. 3 Overview on the SNB Auction from January 2001 to June 2005 (in bn CHF). Source: SNB
the allotment ratio of auctions that used the 1, 2 and 3 week maturity. While on
average approximately 40% of the amount bidded had been allotted—it can be
seen that the allotment ratio varied considerably across time. A comparison of
the allotment and bid amount reveals that the variation in the allotment ratio
mainly comes from the bid-side and not from the allotment side, as the SNB
has always provided approximately the same liquidity (ranging from CHF 2–5
billion) to the banking sector. While a downward trend of the allotment ratio
is apparent since 2004, the Swiss franc repo auction market is still far from the
overbidding phenomenon experienced in the ESCB until June 2000 and will
probably never end up in such a situation.46
In addition to the fixed rate tender auction, the SNB can also use fine-tuning
operations conducted on a bilateral basis. The SNB uses this kind of repo trans-
action to offset undesired effects of external factors on liquidity supply and
fluctuations in the short-term money market rates. Maturity and repo rate may
differ from those of the repo auction conducted on the same day. Counter-
parties of the SNB can also request liquidity in the form of overnight funds
if urgent liquidity needs arise. For such requests, the counterparty should nor-
mally notify the SNB before 3 pm. The SNB will then decide if it will supply
additional liquidity or not, and will approximately charge 25 bp above the auc-
tion repo rate of the same day if it meets these needs. From 2001 to June 2005,
the SNB has conducted repo transactions on a bilateral basis in 100 cases, using
46 See ECB (2000), Breitung and Nautz (2001) and Nautz and Oechssler (2006) for a review and
discussion on the overbidding phenomenon in the ECB System.
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the overnight maturity almost exclusively. In three of these 100 cases, the SNB
acted as a cash taker absorbing liquidity from the banking system.
For both, liquidity obtained through fine-tuning operations as well as through
fixed rate tenders, counterparties have to cover the liquidity provided with at
least 100% of collateral eligible for SNB repos.
Apart from themainfinancing andfine-tuningoperations, theSNBalsooffers
a standing facility, which consists of an intraday facility and a liquidity shortage
financing facility. Intraday liquidity is provided by the SNB to counterparties
on an interest-free basis and was introduced in October 1999. The procedure to
obtain intraday liquidity is the same as for themain financing operations, except
that the banks submit their requests for liquidity for the next bank working day
at 4 pm. Since the introduction of this facility, requests for intraday liquidity
have always been fully allotted. In addition, banks have the possibility to get
further intraday liquidity on a bilateral basis up to the early afternoon of each
working day. Themain intention of the intraday facility is to facilitate the settle-
ment of payment transactions via the SIC and foreign exchange transactions in
the continuous linked settlement (CLS) system. Banks must cover the intraday
liquidity provided with 110% of collaterals eligible for SNB repos. As intraday
liquidity has to be repaid by the end of the value day, it is not considered for
the fulfillment of the minimum reserve and liquidity requirements according
to banking law. Looking at the intraday liquidity volume, it can be seen that
this facility has become more and more important during the last years: While
the average intraday volume reached a value of CHF 1,023 million in 1999, the
amount in 2005 was six times larger (CHF 6,308 million).
The liquidity shortage financing facility in contrast enables banks to get
additional liquidity to bridge unexpected, short-term liquidity shortages or to
ensure that the minimum reserve requirements are met at the end of a report-
ing period. Until 2005, banks were able to get that kind of liquidity through
conventional Lombard advances or through special-rate repo transactions. By
the end of 2005, Lombard advances were entirely replaced by special-rate repos
and as a result banks only have access to central bank money if they are linked
up to the Swiss repo system. For special-rate repo transactions, banks need a
limit that defines the maximum amount of liquidity that can be withdrawn. In
addition they must open a Custody Cover Account ‘SNB’ with SIS, which has
to be covered with collateral eligible for SNB repos at all times to at least 110%
of the limit granted. The interest rate for this financing form is two percent-
age points above the Repo-Overnight-Index47 of the previous day. Special-rate
repos were barely used in 2004 and 2005, reaching a turnover of CHF 0.52 and
CHF 1.02 billion respectively.48 Regarding Lombard advances it can be ascer-
tained that the yearly drawn advances decreased in the last few years: While
47 The Repo Overnight Index is a volume weighted interest rate of overnight GC transactions
between commercial banks traded on the Eurex platform. In addition, transactions will only be
taken into account if the securities provided belong to the ‘SNB GC Basket’.
48 See SNB (2005), p. 41.
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the yearly average of drawn advances reached CHF 42.9 million in 2000, the
average drawn advances amounted to CHF 10 million in 2003.49
4 Conclusion
Looking at the data from the previous sections, it can be concluded that the
Swiss franc repo market, in comparison to the unsecured interbank market,
has gained more and more importance for the management, allocation and
equalization of banks liquidity positions. This mainly results from the capital
adequacy requirements (Basel I) as well as from banking crises all over the
world, which have increased the importance of risk considerations in money
lending. In addition, the features of the Swiss franc repo market such as the
highly standardized trading, clearing and settlement system have supported the
development of secured interbank lending. This naturally had effects on unse-
cured lending. According to a major money market broking house in Switzer-
land, unsecured lending decreased by 28% since the introduction of repurchase
agreements in 1999. While unsecured lending with maturities between 3 and 6
months remained unaffected, lending in the shorter end (up to 3 months) and
longer end (6 months to 1 year) decreased by 30 and 20%, respectively. Still
it is assumed that the unsecured interbank market dominates the secured one.
According to estimates by the SNB,50 it is assumed that the outstanding amount
of unsecured interbank lending amounts to CHF 100 billion, thus 1.5 times the
amount outstanding on the Swiss franc repo market. Unfortunately, no further
precise statements can be made on the development of unsecured lending, as
these transactions are mainly conducted over-the-counter (OTC) and are thus
not publicly available.
Compared to other countries, only few publications have been made on the
Swiss franc repo market. Explanations for the scarce publication landscape
are the rather young repo market in Switzerland, as well as the absence of an
overbidding phenomenon in the almost daily conducted repo auctions. Up until
now, the SNB, in contrast to the ECB, has been spared by an extreme overbid-
ding, which was experienced in the Euro zone from 1999 to June 2000. Data on
the repo auction as well as the SNB’s flexibility in meeting the banks liquidity
needs, further lead to the conclusion that such an overbidding phenomenon will
probably not occur in Switzerland. However, there seems to be an interest rate
spread conundrum on the Swiss franc interbank market. Veyrassat (2004) com-
pared the actual repo rates with the quoted depot rates (unsecured interbank
lending) for 1 week and 3month investments and established that between 2000
and 2003 the spread had narrowed from 9–11 bp to around 5–8 bp. Considering
counterparty risks and capital adequacy requirements, the spread should theo-
retically be somewhere between 20 and 30 bp. Further research could therefore
49 For 2004, only the year-end value of drawn Lombard advances was published, which reached a
value of CHF 6.6 million.
50 See Veyrassat (2004), p. 44.
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be done on spread calculations based upon actual repo and depot rates as well
as on a cause analysis on the ‘mispricing’ of either repo or depot transactions.
In comparison to other central banks, such as the ECB or FED, which use
a point target of the overnight rate, the SNB decided to steer a longer-term
interest rate, namely the 3M-Libor. Further research could thus also be done
by the comparison of transmission and stabilizing effects as well as by analyz-
ing the effectiveness of monetary policy on the economy with different target
rates. Provided that the further development of secured lending continues, it
could very well be that the importance of the 3M-Libor, which represents an
unsecured interest rate, decreases, thus asking for a new target interest rate for
Swiss monetary policy.
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